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FRIGHT AND MENTAL ANGUISH AS AN
ELEMENT OF DAMAGES*
By P. J. CLARKE
in both the Greek and the Roman law injury to the person
meant injury to honor or insult but came later to mean any wil-
ful disregard of another's personality. In consequence the be-
ginnings of law measure composition not by the extent of the
injury to the body, but by the extent of the injury to honor and
the extent of the desire for revenge aroused, since the interest
secured is really the social interest in preserving the peace. 28
Har. L. Rev. 357.
The law secured the individual's interest in his honor at
least as soon as his interest in his physical person, presently it
distinguished between injuries to the person and injuries to honor
and reputation, but it has moved very slowly in protecting feel-
ing in any respect other than against insult or dishonor. Three
steps may be noted. At first only physical injury is considered.
Later overcoming the will is held a legal wrong; in other words
an individual interest in free exercise of the will is recognized
and secured. Finally the law begins to take the account purely
subjective mental injuries and to even regard infringement of
the sensibilities of another.
Our government exists for the benefit of the governed, and
this benefit is afforded in the establishment and the protection of
rights. Every law exists for the purpose of establishing and
protecting legal rights. A legal right is a right with which the
law invests one person and in respect to which, for his benefit, a
duty is imposed on another or others to do or refrain from doing
certain acts. Whenever a right is given, the duty to respect such
right springs into existence. "Violation of right' and 'breach
of duty' are Equivalent terms." Hale On Damages, 11.
The one fundamental right of which all men are desirous,
and for the enforcement of which governments are established, is
the right not to be harmed in any respect which affects their be-
ing and well being, their happiness, and immunity from pains.
The rights and liberties of the individual are restricted in so far
*Thesis for degree of Jorls Doctor. 1927.
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as they interfere with the rights and liberties of others. When
an individual so uses his own as to cause injury to another he
violates a right owing to that other party. Our governments
through their legislatures and courts, to avoid the destructful
state that would naturally follow if personal vengeance were al-
lowed, have worked out a system of damages whereby the in-
jured party may receive redress in our courts.
The justice and fairness of protecting the individual against
injury resulting from fright and nervous shock and even against
purely mental injury is very apparent. The Courts, however,
have been very reluctant in considering fright and mental an-
guish as an element of damage. The obstacles which seem to
impede the path of justice in such cases are threefold: (1) Fright
in itself is too intangible and uncertain to allow a recovery for it
alone, and as there can be no recovery for it alone there should
be no recovery for damages arising from fright; (2) that the
physical consequences of fright are too remote, or in other words
are not the proximate result of the defendant's act; and (3) that
expediency demands that there be no recovery for the physical
or mental consequences of fright.
The development of this subject in the field of damages has
been slow and cautious. We find it first considered with wilful
wrongs and contemporanoues physical injuries. Then in the
case where the fright and mental shock results in some physical
injury. And finally where the only injury suffered is purely
mental.
The case where the fright and mental anguish is found ac-
companied by a contemporaneous physical injury is the least dif-'
ficult of the problems with which we have to deal. In this case
we have the action brought for the contemporaneous injury and
not for the fright. Thus we have the principles as laid down,
by obiter, by Holmes, J. in Spade v,. Lynn & B. R. Co. 172 Mass.
488.: "By something of an anomaly, consequences of the de-
fendant's conduct which would not of themselves constitute a
cause of action may at times enhance the damages if the conduct
has some other consequences for which an action lies". The in-
jury then resulting from fright, the fright being caused by the
act of physical injury, the resulting damages may be proved. But
it is contended in some cases that the injury resulting from fright
or mental anguish is too remote for a recovery to be allowed.
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
121 N. Y. Supp. 22; 52 N. E. (Mass.) 747.'
The greatest difficulty arises where the injury is purely men-
tal with no readily ascertainable physical effects. The opportun-
ity for the practice of fraud and imposture raises the question of
the expediency of allowing it to be considered in assessing dam-
ages. The mere hardship of estimating the damage suffered
should not, however, prevent the injured party from recovering
for a wrong suffered and has been handled with satisfaction by
the courts.
The principle that recovery may be had where the fright and
mental anguish is accompanied by a contemporaneous physical
injury is fairly well settled as a review of the practical unanimity
of modern decisions in this country will show.2
Allowing the recovery of damages for injuries for which no
cause of action lies is but a step to the acknowledgement of such
a cause of action. To quote from, Street, Foundations of Legal
Liability, I, 470; "The treatment of any element of damage as a
parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal
evolution. A factor that is today recognized as parasitic will,
forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of
legal liability. It is merely a question of social, economic, and
industrial needs as those needs are reflected in the organic law".
The case which best illustrates this principle is the one in
which the fright or nervous shock unaccompanied by any impact
or other actionable injury, develops into palpable physical injury.
Some of our courts in dealing with this proposition have been
inclined to deny recovery and to follow the ruling in Victorian Rail-
uays Commissioners v. Coultas, 8 Eng. Rul. Cases 405, which laid
down the rule; "Damages that are not natural, probable, immediate,
or proximate consequences of a wrongful act are not recover-
able".3
While other courts hold a more limited rule to the effect that
there can be no recovery for injuries resulting from fright occasioned
by negligence where there is no immediate personal injury, trespass
to realty, nor any contract relation.4
I But see 211 N. Y. Supp. 583, and 132 N. E. (Mass.) 622 apparently re-
versing these decisions.
2 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Roberts (1925). 269 S. W. (IKy.) 333; Sider v.Reid Ice Cream Co. (1925). 211 N. Y. Supp. 583. Kisiel v. Iolyoke Street R.Co. (1921), *31 N. E. (Mass.) 622; Hines v. Evans (1920), 105 S. E. (Ga.)59; Pennsylvania Co. v. White (1927), 242 Fed. 437.3 Iaile v. Texas & P. R. Co. (1894), 60 Fed. 557; Braun v. Craven (1898),51 N. E. (Ill.) 401. Weissman v. Wells (1924), 267 S. W. (Mo.) 400.Smith v. Gowdy (1922), 244 S. W. (Ky.) 678; Reed v Ford (1908), 112S. W. (Ky.) 600; Alexander v. Pacholek (1923), 192 N. W. (Mich.) 652.
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These cases denying recovery hold that such damages are
too remote; that they cannot be considered the proximate re-
suit of defendant's act because of the intervening fright; but be-
fore an intervening cause may operate to insulate defendant's
negligence, it must be an independent cause,--one not set in
motion by the defendant. So if defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the fright, and fright, in probable and natural
sequence, the proximate cause of physical injury, the chain of
causation is complete, and the fright is not an independent cause.
Purcell v. St. Paul City R. Co. 50 N. W. (Minn.) 1034. On the
other hand we have the argument that, since fright alone is too
intangible and uncertain to allow a recovery for fright alone,
there can be no recovery for the consequence of fright- These
courts, however, lose sight of the fact that in the second case
the basis of the action is not the fright but the physical injury,
a tangible, material harm, which the court has always regarded
as a legal injury. 3 L. R. A. (N. S.> 49.
In Lindley sr. Knouiton (1918), 176 Pac. (Cal.) 440, the action
was for injuries to the physical health of the platntiff due to an
attack on her and her children by an escaped chimpanzee. Plain-
tiff was not touched by the chimpanzee and her injury was due
solely to fright. The court in distinguishing this case from those
in which fright was the sole gravaman held that in the case at
bar physical detriment was pleaded and that there was evidence
in support thereof.
On the whole there is apparently no good reason why the
wrongful invasion of a legal right (and surely the inviolability
of the person is a legal right,> cau.sing an injury to the body or
mind which reputable physicians recognize and can trace with
a reasonable degree of certainty to the act as its true cause,
should not give to the injured party a right of action against the
wrongdoer, although there was no visible hurt at the time of the
action complained of. Of course there is always the possibility
of trumped up charges where no evidence of bodily injury can
be traced immediately. However, the matter is in the hands of
the courts, and by the use of sound discretion under proper in-
structions from the court the jury will take care of this.
Thus this proposition may be sumed up as held in Simone v .
Rhode Island C. 66 Atl. (R. I.) 202: "Where the negligence of a
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defendant is such as to cause fright, and as a natural consequence
of such fright a series of physical ills follows, or if the fright as
a cause gives rise to nervous disturbances and those in turn to
;physical troubles, the defendant is liable for the physical results
of its own negligence, although there was no actual physical in-
jury at the time of the accident."5
Having considered fright and mental shock causing a phy-
sical injury we now come to the case of purely subjective mental
injuries and injuries to the sensibilities.
It was well settled at common law that mere injury to the
feelings or affections, though" wrongful, did not constitute an in-
dependent basis for the recovery of damages. A s a general rule,
following this theory and supported by the weight of authority,
-mental pain and suffering will not alone constitute a basis for
recovery of substantial 'damages. This rule is not, however,
without exceptions and it is well recognized that a recovery may
be had in actions for breach of contract to marry, and certain
cases of wilful wrong, especially those affecting the personal
security, character of, reputation, or domestic relations of the
injured person, in whch cases mental suffering is recognized as
the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequence of the wrong
complained of. In any event a very -slight injury constituting
a ground of action will support a recovery for accompanying 6
mental suffering. In all the cases so holding the right of action
arises out of tort or breach of contract and is not based solely
upon the mental anguish.
The apparent reason for the courts' refusal to sustain an
independent action ,is laid to the remoteness of such damages,
and in the metaphysical character of sich an injury, considered
apart from physical pain. That such injuries are more senti-
mental than substantial. Having their basis in the physical and
nervous condition of the complaining .party, the suffering of one
under precisely the same circumstances being no test of the
suffering of another. Vague and shadowy, there is no possible
standard by which such an injury can be justly compensated or
5 Hanford v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St R. Co. (925), 203 N. W. (Neb.)
643; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Kimber (1924) 101 So (Ala.) 827; Lambert
v. Brewster (1924). 125 S. E. (W. Va.) 244; ! enney V. Wong Len, (1925),
128 Atl. (N. H.) 343; 11 A. L. R. 1119.
6 17 C. J. 831; Gardner v. Cumberland Tel. Co. et al (1925) 268 s. W.(Ky.) 1108; 251 S W. (Ark.) 355, 1923; Stein v. Greenebaum (1918). 203 S.
W. Tex.P )l ean H-otel Co. (1916), 186 S. W. (Mo.) 41; Koerber
v. Patek (1905), 102 N. W. (Wis.) 40; see 23 A. L. R. 361.
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even approximately measured. Easily stimulated and impos-
sible to disprove it is said to fall within all the objections of
speculative damages, which are universally excluded because
of their uncertain character. Summerfied v. Western Union Tel.
Co. N. W. (Wis.) 973.
However, this rule against uncertain or contingent damages
applies only to those damages which are not the certain result
of the breach, and not to such as are the certain results but un-
certain in amount. Every day the courts handle cases in which
substantial damages are established, but the amount is, in so far
as susceptible of pecuniary admeasurement, either uncertain or
extremely difficult of ascertainment; in such cases the recovery
is allowed and the amount is fixed by the jury in the use of sound
discretion under proper instructions from the court. 17 C. J.
756-757.
Granting that it is a cardinal rule that when damhages are
assessed against anyone such damages must be actual and real-
not conjectural or speculative, this rule is to promote and not
to defeat justice. As was said in Couch v. Kansag Southern R. Co.
158 S. W. (Mo.) 347, in speaking of this rule: "This, however,
is only an abstract rule of law; a general guide to be followed so
long as it promotes justice, and to be put aside when it leads in
the opposite direction."
Man's security in his person is a right recognized by law and
zealously guarded by the courts. Yet, is the mind any less a
part of the person than the body, and the injury suffered any less
consequential because there is no physical manifestation of it?
Mental suffering is sometime more acute and lasting than phy-
sical pain. Indeed the suffering of each frequently, if not usually,
acts reciprocally on the other. In fact it is impossible to conceive
of physical suffering without attending mental suffering. The
courts, realizing this have, in the majority of case allowed a re-
covery for the mental suffering in assessing the damage in such
actions.
In a large class of actions for torts in which substantial dam-
ages are authorized and sustained for the injury to the feelings
of the plaintiff the other damage is merely nominal. As instan-
ces of such actions, we have the case of the husband suing for
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an injury to his wife, or for seducing or enticing her away from
him, and that ,of a parent suing for the seduction 'of his daughter.
In these cases the real injury sued for is the injury to the feel-
ings and not the loss of services. "'The loss of services upon
which the actions are technically based being but a legal fiction,
and more imaginary than real." Wadsworth v. Western Union Tel.
Co. 8 S. W. (Tenn) 574. Thus we find that which is denied a right"
in itself given that right under the guise of another action.
Due to the reluctance of the courts to go against established
precedent fright and mental anguish is denied as an independent
cause of action. Yet, as we have seen the majority -f the courts
recognizing the justice and fairness of such a recovery have al-
lowed it as a parasitic element of damage under one. action or
another. As the physical injuries due to fright were at first
allowed only as a parasitic element of damage, then made an in-
dependent cause of action, so is the development of purely sub-
jective mental injuries. Today, purely subjective mental suffer-
ing is recognized as a parasitic element of damage; tomorrow,
it will constitute an independent cause of action.
